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NUMERUS CLAUSUS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW REAL RIGHTS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 




Numerus clausus or a closed system is one of the basic principles of the law of 
property. The main aim of this principle is to attain certainty and predictability in the 
property sphere. Therefore this principle entails firstly, that only recognised real 
rights can be constituted (Typenzwang) and secondly that the content of a recognised 
real right is fairly rigid and not susceptible to radical change by the party (or parties) 
creating the specific right (Typenfixierung). Since the first step in the creation of a 
real right is the embodiment of the right in a notarial deed agreed to by the parties, the 
crucial question is whether an obligation agreed to as part of the content of a real right 
creates a real right binding on successors in title of the property concerned or creates 
only a personal obligation binding only on the present owner of the land burdened 
with the real right (servient land). 
The answer to this question in South African law is complicated by at least 
three factors. Firstly, since South African law does not formally recognise the 
principle of numerus clausus, the two elements of this principle are intertwined which 
means that the question whether a particular right is real and registrable is closely 
connected with the content of that right. Secondly, although the principle of numerus 
clausus is not formally recognised, South African law is very cautious to recognise 
new real rights outside traditional categories with the consequence that the content of 
a new real right is strongly influenced by the content of the analogous real right, 
which provides the basis for its recognition. Thirdly, the question of whether a right is 
real or personal has become entangled with the logically different issue of what may 
competently be registered in the Deeds Office. Although the Registrar of Deeds is not 
allowed to register personal rights, personal rights are from time to time registered 
without it being clear whether such registration has proprietary consequences. 
The aim of this paper is first, to provide a general background to the 
development of real rights in South Africa keeping in mind that South Africa is not 
impeded by a rigid principle of numerus clausus in the sense that the Deeds Registries 
Act contains a list of registrable rights.1 Thereafter I shall provide a few illustrations 
of the recognition of new real rights within traditional categories before finally 
attempting to pull all the strings together and to provide a few tentative suggestions of 
how the present problem can be clarified. 
 
                                                 
* Professor of Civil Law, University of Aberdeen, Advocate of the High Court of South Africa. 
My colleague, Professor David Carey Miller made valuable comments on preliminary drafts 
of this contribution but the author alone is responsible for the conclusions reached in the final 
version. 
1  Although s 3(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 contains a list of real rights, provision 
is made in s 3(1)(r) for the registration of real rights not mentioned in the Act. Furthermore 




The recognition of new real rights in South Africa 
 
 South African law as an uncodified system of private law inherited its basic 
circle of traditional real rights from Roman law. Roman law recognized only three 
types of proprietary interests namely ownership (dominium), servitudes (servitutes) 
and real security (pignus and hypotheca) with hereditary lease of land (emphyteusis or 
‘erfpacht’) and the right of building on another’s land (superficies or ‘opstal’) as post-
classical supplements. The reason for accepting a numerus clausus of real rights in 
Roman law was to avoid ownership of land being cluttered with a plethora of real 
rights binding all successors in title.2 With the rise of feudalism during the Middle 
Ages a great variety of new burdens on land3 held by vassals were recognised in 
favour of feudal lords. The haphazard reception of some of these rights in Roman-
Dutch law breached the numerus clausus since a closed list of what was received was 
never attempted. The most important categories of real rights recognized by the 
Roman-Dutch writers4 were ownership, possession,5 the right of an heir to an 
inheritance, servitudes, mortgage and pledge, erfpacht and huisgebouwrecht and 
tiendrecht, cijnsen and tijnsen (the right to a nominal tax)6, and with the acceptance of 
the maxim ‘huur gaat voor koop’ as applicable to houses and land (‘huisen en 
landen’), a new real right in favour of the lessee of land.7  
While not transplanting the variety of burdens associated with feudalism, 
South Africa followed Roman-Dutch law in not formally recognizing a numerus 
clausus of real rights. In fact South Africa initially had a smaller circle of traditional 
real rights than Roman-Dutch law since possession8 was never uniformly recognized 
as a real right and with the introduction of the English system of administration of 
estates the traditional real right of an heir to claim the inheritance was transferred to 
                                                 
2  See inter alia R Sohm Institutes A Textbook of the History and System of Roman Private Law 
3 ed translated by JC Ledlie (1907) 338; J A C Thomas Textbook of Roman Law (1976) 195–
210. Superficies and emphyteusis were forms of perpetual leases with regard to buildings and 
land. See W W Buckland Text-book of Roman Law 3 ed  Stein (1965) 275-276. 
3  See A S De Blécourt Kort Begrip van het Oud-Vaderlands Burgerlijk Recht 7 ed Fischer 
(1967) 94, who mentions 40 categories of real rights recognized under feudal law. See also 
Hugo Grotius Inleidinge 2. 3. 8, 2. 40. 1, 2. 46. 1; Johannes Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 
1. 8. 23; P van Warmelo ‘Real Rights’  1959 Acta Juridica 84. Examples are the charges on 
land for safe escort, the right to collect an annuity on land sold, annual quitrents from land 
held on quitrent tenure, rights of hunting and fishing, rights to salt-pans and metal mines, 
rights to hearth-moneys, turf taxes, rights of reversion of land to particular families, and the 
so-called “naastingsrecht”, namely a type of right of pre-emption in favour of members of the 
family.  
4  See inter alia Grotius Inleidinge  2. 1. 60, 2. 3. 8; Voet Commentarius 5. 2. 2; Ulricus Huber 
Heedendaegshe Rechts-geleertheydt 2. 2. 4, 2. 2. 17, 2. 36. 2; Dionysius Godefridus van der 
Keessel Praelectiones ad Hugo Grotii Introductionem 2. 1. 60; Johannes van der Linden 
Koopmans Handboek 1. 6. 2. 
5  Not all Roman-Dutch law writers treated possession as a category of a real right; see Ulricus 
Huber Eunomia Romana ad I 1. 2. 12; Van der Linden 1. 6. 2. Voet 6. 1. 1 treats emphyteusis 
as a form of beneficial ownership (dominium utile). 
6  See also Marijke Reinsma Het onderscheid tussen zakelijke en persoonlijke rechten met 
betrekking tot onroerend goed in het Zuidafrikaanse recht (LLD thesis Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam 1970) 7–9. 
7  See J C de Wet ‘Huur gaat voor Koop’ 1944 THRHR 166 at 190–192 
8  On possession as a real right, see C G van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 91-92 
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the executor of the deceased estate.9 After the British Occupation of the Cape in 1806, 
although the property rights of the Cape colonists were guaranteed, the Roman-Dutch 
erfpagrecht became mixed up with the English form of land tenure perpetual quitrent 
and the Roman-Dutch opstalreg was apparently engulfed by the English form of land 
tenure leasehold. For the rest, the South African circle of real rights was extended 
whenever the need arose to elevate a specific right on land to the status and protection 
of a real right. This extension was initiated either by specific legislation or by the 
courts. Interestingly, both lawmakers moved closely within the framework of 
traditional categories.10   
 
Development of new categories within the framework of servitudes 
 
 The most fertile sphere for the development of new real rights by the courts 
turned out to be within the framework of servitudes. Examples are the new typically 
South African praedial servitudes of trekpath and outspan, a category of irregular 
servitudes mixing the features of both praedial and personal servitudes and new types 
of personal servitudes.11 In the most important decision on the ‘subtraction of the 
dominium’ test for recognising new real rights, Lorentz v Melle12, the judge started by 
enquiring whether it was possible to classify the right in question namely to claim half 
of the profits in a future development on the land as a praedial servitude. For our 
purposes the development of mineral rights and the recognition of restrictive 
conditions in township developments as urban praedial servitudes is however the most 
significant. 
 The recognition of mineral rights as a separate real right in land alongside 
ownership in contravention of the cuius est solum rule was spearheaded by the Cape 
practice (following the British practice) of granting State land with the reservation of 
mineral rights in favour of the state, the overriding importance of mining to the South 
African economy after the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa in the 
second half of the 19th century and the fact that large mining companies needed 
security of title before investing in the expensive activities of prospecting for minerals 
and then mining them.13 Forced by economic realities, the English principle that land 
can be divided into horizontal layers was not accepted, and independent mineral rights 
                                                 
9  D Hutchinson et al Wille’s Principles of SA Law 8ed (1991) 356 still considers the right of an 
heir to his inheritance as a real right; see also Kelly v Estate Scallan 1916 CPD 20. The 
Administration of Estates of Deceased Persons Ordinance 104 of 1833 (Cape) introduced the 
English system of administration of estates in the Cape in terms of which an executor 
administered the estate of a deceased. The Administration of Estates Act 24 of 1913, later 
superseded by the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965, extended this system to the 
whole of South Africa. On the death of the testator the heir only acquires the right to claim 
transfer of the inheritance; see Estate Smith v Estate Follett 1942 AD 364 at 367 and 383; Ex 
parte Craig 1946 WLD 475 478; Greenberg v Estate Greenberg 1955 3 SA 361 (A) 365 at 
366; Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Brooks 1964 2 SA 566 (A) 573. Only an executor 
can vindicate property which form part of an inheritance: Krige v Scoble 1912 TPD 814 at 
820; Estate Smith v Estate Follett at 367. 
10  See also Marijke Reinsma op cit note 6 at 54-95. 
11  For a discussion of these servitudes, see C G van der Merwe op cit note 8 at 483-484, 496, 
501-505 and 507. 
12  1978 3 SA 1044 (T).  
13  See C G van der Merwe op cit note 8 at 553; J R L Milton ‘Ownership’ in Reinhard 
Zimmermann & Daniel Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South 
Africa (1996) 681. 
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were since 1881 recognised in the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek of the Transvaal and 
later in the precursors of and the present Deeds Registries Act.14 The courts first 
classified mineral rights as quasi-servitudes15 and more particularly as quasi-personal 
servitudes.16 Only three South African cases up to now had the courage to take 
mineral rights out of the mould of servitudes and classify them as real rights sui 
generis.17 This classification allows mineral rights to have a sui generis content 
namely to be freely assignable and transmissible, not to be subject to the constraint of 
being exercised salva rei substantia, not terminated when the owner regains 
ownership of the land subject to mineral rights and creating the possibility of 
mortgaging a mineral right and of constituting a usufruct over mineral rights.18 Note 
that although the holder of a mineral right need not return the land after mining to the 
owner salva rei substantia, there is a positive duty on him to restore the agricultural 
potential of the land as far as possible.19 
 During the second half of the 19th century, South African courts also adopted 
the township development mechanism of restrictive covenants used in post Industrial 
Revolution Britain to regulate the chaotic expansion of towns like Johannesburg after 
the discovery of diamonds and gold.20 Instead of accepting the alien concept of an 
equitable interest in land21, the South African courts moulded restrictive conditions in 
townships on the traditional concept of either a personal servitude or a praedial urban 
servitude depending on whether the original developer intended to favour himself or 
all the owners of erven in the township. To make doubly sure that restrictive 
conditions would be binding on successors in title the truly Roman-Dutch concept of 
stipulatio alteri was added. Examples of such conditions are that the erven in a 
particular township may only be used for residential purposes, that certain kinds of 
business or other activities are prohibited on all the erven in the township, that only 
one residence may be erected on an erf and that only certain types of building 
materials may be used on an erf. An important consequence of the derivation of 
restrictive conditions from English law and the fact that they were mostly classified as 
urban praedial servitudes was that in accordance with the principle of servitus in 
faciendo consistere nequit, restrictive conditions could never place a positive 
obligation on the owner of an erf. 
                                                 
14  See Resolution of the Volksraad of the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek of 8 November 1881 
article 3 of Act 7 of 1883; s 30-32 of the Registration of Deeds and Titles Act 25 of 1909 
(Transvaal); s 3(j), 13 and 41 of the Deeds Registries Act 13 of 1918 and  ss 70 and 71of the 
Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. For early decisions, see Taylor v Van Jaarsveldt & 
Nellmapius 1886 2 SAR 137; McDonald v Versfeld 1888 2 SAR 234. 
15  Coronation Collieries v Malan 1911 TPD 577 at 591; Rocher v Registrar of Deeds 1911 TPD 
311 at 316. 
16  Lazarus and Jackson v Wessels 1903 TS 499 at 510; Van Vuren & Others v Registrar of 
Deeds 1907 TS 289 at 294-295; Ex parte Marchini 1964 1 SA 147 (T) 150; Aussenkjer 
Diamante (Pty) Ltd v Namex (Pty) Ltd & another 1980 3 SA 896 (SWA) 902-023. 
17  Ex parte Pierce & Others 1950 3 SA 628 (O) at 634; Erasmus v Afrikander Proprietary 
Mines Ltd 1976 2 SA 950 (W) 956E; Apex Mines Ltd v Administrator Transvaal 1986 4 SA 
581 (T) 590I-591C.  
18  See C G van der Merwe op cit note 8 at  560-562.  
19  See C G van der Merwe op cit note 564: he must exercise his mineral rights civiliter modo. 
20  See in general C G van der Merwe in W A Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa first reissue 
Vol 24 Servitudes (2000) par 419 
21  See Tulk v Moxley (1848) 2 Ph 774. See further AWB Simpson Introduction to the History of 
Land Law (1961) 238-243. 
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 A South African doctoral thesis22 has, however, recently questioned whether 
restrictive conditions in townships have sufficient affinities with urban praedial 
servitudes to permit forcing them into the servitutal mould. The main differences 
between restrictive conditions and praedial urban servitudes are the following: 
restrictive conditions are not constituted for the benefit of a particular plot of land but 
for the benefit of all the plots of land in the township; a general township scheme is a 
central requirement for the enforcement of restrictive conditions; restrictive 
conditions are reciprocal in the sense that all the plots of land in the township are 
simultaneously dominant and servient tenements; the notion of utilitas has a peculiar 
meaning in this sphere with the emphasis on the retention of the character of the 
neighbourhood or the reservation of the amenities of the particular township; the 
notion of vicinitas is not construed on the basis of the usefulness of the erven to one 
another but on whether they form part of the same township; the title deeds of the 
properties concerned do not indicate which plot of land is the dominant land; and the 
methods of extinction of restrictive conditions and urban servitudes differ.23 
Consequently, it is suggested that burdens placed on land should be construed as real 
rights sui generis. This would open the door for the recognition of positive obligations 
on the owners of erven in a township qua owners and not in their personal capacity. In 
the case of Thompson v Port Elizabeth Municipality24 a condition compelling the 
erection of dwellings of not less than a certain value has been accepted as valid. 
Because of their affinity with other conditions in town planning schemes, it is 
suggested that restrictive conditions should be taken out of the realm of servitude law 
and placed in the sphere of planning law burdens imposed for the benefit of an entire 
community.25 
 
Development of new categories in the sphere of lease and leasehold 
 
 Like a number of traditional limited real rights, lease originates in contract but 
may, if certain requirements are fulfilled also have real effect against successors of 
the original lessor. This proprietary effect of lease had its origin in the maxim huur 
gaat voor koop, which was accepted in Roman-Dutch law26 from Germanic law and 
Old Dutch customary and statutory rules.27 The rationale for this rule was to protect 
the lessee of land and residential premises (huisen en landen) from eviction. It was 
                                                 
22  Jeannie van Wyk Restrictive Conditions as Urban Land-Use Planning Instruments (LLD 
University of South Africa 1990). 
23  See especially Jeannie van Wyk ‘The Nature and Classification of Restrictive Conditions of 
Title’ (1992) 25 De Jure 270 at 281-287. 
24  1989 4 SA 765 (A) 770. 
25  This would give them the character of public law restrictions and thus place them in the same 
category as other conditions of title dealing inter alia with the provision of services in 
township developments. 
26  The full implications of this rule were not fully explored by the Roman-Dutch writers. See 
Voet Commentarius 19. 2. 19; Schorer Aantekeninge note 398; Abraham à Wesel Tractatus 
De Remissione Mercedis in Opera Omnia 1. 19 and 20. The following writers recognized that 
the effect of the rule was to create a real right in favour of the lessee: Grotius Inleidinge 2. 44. 
9 and 3. 19. 16; Simon van Leeuwen Costumen, Keuren ende Ordonnantien van Rijnland ad 
art 97; Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Grotius 2. 44. 9. 
27  Local Keuren which contained this rule are Rynland, Amsterdam, Haarlem, Middelburg and 
Zieriksee. See further H D J Bodenstein Huur van Huizen en Landen volgens het 
Hedendaagsch Romeinnsch-Hollandsch Recht (doctoral thesis Leiden 1907) 132ff; W E 
Cooper Landlord and Tenant 2 ed (1994) 275. 
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considered inequitable that a lessee who has made himself comfortable in a house for 
a period of years be evicted at the whim of the lessor selling the house.28A distinction 
was made between long leases and short leases. A long lease only has proprietary 
effect on being registered, whereas entering into occupation of the land establishes a 
real right in a short lease.29 South African law has accorded lessees of land the full 
proprietary protection of a real right exercisable against third party intruders in 
addition to applicable possessory remedies. 30  More importantly for our purpose, it is 
generally accepted that the express or implied terms of the contract of lease are 
inextricably intertwined with the real right. This means that the purchaser of leased 
land acquires a series of personal obligations inter alia the duty to maintain the 
property for as long as he remains owner of the land. 31 On the other hand the duty of 
the lessee to use the land salva rei substantia  (with the retention of its substance) 
remains owed to whoever is the owner-lessor.32 
 In addition to lease of land, South African law has since the British occupation 
accepted that state grants of land could also be in the form of the purely English 99-
years leasehold with the state remaining the reversionary owner.33  These leaseholds 
trickled down to a few isolated cases after statutes were passed to provide for the 
conversion of leaseholds to ownership.34 It, however received a short new lease of life 
in 1978 when the apartheid government in order to promote political stability 
searched for a mechanism to render the tenure of urban Blacks in large cities like 
Soweto next to Johannesburg more secure. Under the apartheid system, Blacks in 
white urban areas were regarded as temporary sojourners who needed either a permit 
or certificate of occupation to occupy sites in these areas.35 Since the granting of 
ownership was in direct conflict with the apartheid policy, the South African 
legislator seized upon leasehold and introduced a form of statutory leasehold in197836, 
which was confirmed and liberalized by the Black Communities Development Act of 
1984.37  In terms of this Act ‘competent’ Blacks could apply to the relevant local 
authority for the registration of leasehold on the site they were occupying. Although 
the site remained the property of the local authority, a certificate of registration 
                                                 
28  See A P L Nelissen Huur en Vervreemding (doctoral thesis Leiden 1880) 170: ‘‘Bij de 
ontwikkeling van de huur kwam de ondoelmatigheid van de ‘koop breekt huur’ aan het licht. 
Dat in de strenge toepassing van dezen regel een groote harheid lag, viel bovendien moeilijk 
te ontkennen. Gaf men eenmaal den huurder recht op de zaak, althans zoolang deze onder den 
verhuurder bleef, ‘t scheen onbillijk, dat door eene willekeurige daad des verhuurders de 
huurder van zijn right verstoken bleef. Onbillijk, dat een huurder, die voor een tijd van eenige 
jaren eene woning heeft gehuurd en juis met de oog op deze termijn alles comfortable had 
ingericht, van den eene dag op de anderen tot ontruimen zou kunnen worden gedwongen.’ 
29  See generally C G van der Merwe op cit note 8 at 597-598.  
30  See W E Cooper op cit note 27 at 277ff; Carole Lewis ‘Real Rights in Land: A New Look at 
an Old Subject’ (1987) 104 SALJ 599 
31  See W E Cooper op cit note 27 at 294-298; C G van der Merwe  op cit n 8 at 598-600; 
Kenneth Reid ‘Obligations and Property: Exploring the Border’ 1999 Acta Juridica 228, 239-
240. 
32  C G van der Merwe  op cit note 8 at 601. 
33  See C G van der Merwe op cit note 8 at 590-591 
34  Conversion of Leasehold to Freehold Act 61 of 1952; Kimberley Leasehold Conversion to 
Freehold Act 40 of 1961. 
35  See in general C G van der Merwe and J M Pienaar ‘Land Reform in South Africa’ in Paul 
Jackson and David Wilde (eds) The Reform of Property Law (1997) 340-342. 
36  Blacks (Urban Areas) Amendment Act 97 of 1978, s 6A. 
37  See also Conversion of Certain Land to Leasehold Act 81 of 1988. 
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entitled the holder to most of the entitlements of the holder of a real right: he could 
erect, occupy, alter or demolish buildings on the site, establish a mortgage, usufruct or 
other real right on the leasehold, sublet, alienate or transmit it to his or her heirs. To 
encourage survey and the preparation of proper diagrams of sites the rights of 
alienation of leaseholders of unsurveyed sites were curtailed and they were given a 
period of four years to complete the necessary surveys. These leaseholds could 
initially only be acquired by so-called competent persons38 which depended on 10 
years of employment in White South Africa and registration occurred in special 
registers created by Regulations under the Act.39  The relevant Act was amended in 
1986 to allow Blacks to obtain ownership in Black areas or to convert leasehold to 
ownership.40 Although the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1991 
abolished most of the parent statutes, the sections of the Acts dealing with these 
matters were retained.41 
 In terms of the new constitutional land reform programme with its objectives 
of restitution, redistribution and tenure reform, two traditional forms of tenancy 
namely labour tenancy and sharecropping have been identified in the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act42of 1994 as an interest in land that is open to restitution. The system 
of labour tenancy that allowed black families to live on and exploit certain parts of 
white-owned farms in return of labour in lieu of rent was abolished by legislation in 
1964.43 Sharecropping allowed Blacks to reside and work on parts of white-owned 
land with the white owner providing the seed and the parties sharing the crop in terms 
of an agreed arrangement This system was effectively abolished by the Natives Land 
Act of 191344 when Blacks were not longer allowed rights in land in white areas. The 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act of 199645 grants security of tenure to persons 
falling into the category of labour tenants and enables them to apply for ownership of 
a portion of the farm.46 Disposed sharecroppers can in terms of the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act apply to be restored to their former position or to be granted equitable 
relief.47  Note that a vast majority of Black workers on farms would not fall into these 
categories and has to seek protection under a sophisticated system of labour law rather 
than rely on any kind of security of tenure.48 
 
Development of new categories in the sphere of ownership 
 
                                                 
38  S 1 read with s 52(1). 
39  Act 97 of 1978 s 6B. 
40  Black Communities Development Amendment Act 74 of 1986 s 57A and 57D. 
41  Act 108 of 1991 retaining s 52-57 and s 57A. 
42  Act 22 of 1994. See in general D L Carey Miller and Anne Pope Land Title in South Africa 
(2000) 567-575; C G van der Merwe and J M Pienaar  op cit note 35 at 361-363. 
43  In 1964 the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 was substantially amended by the Bantu 
Laws Amendment Act 42 of 1964 to abolish the system. In De Jager v Sisana 1930 AD 71 at 
85 it was held that these contracts were innominate contracts that did not give rise to real 
rights in land. 
44  Act 27 of 1913. 
45  Act 3 of 1996 
46  S 16(1) of the Act. See D L Carey Miller and Anne Pope op cit not 42 at 585-587; D L Carey 
Miller ‘A New Property’ (1999) 103 SALJ 752; C G van der Merwe and J M Pienaar  op cit 
note 35 at 360-361. 
47  Act 22 of 1994 s 35 read with s 33. 
48  D L Carey Miller and Anne Pope op cit note 42 at 585-586. 
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The Sectional Titles Act was promulgated in 197149 to provide urgently 
needed residential accommodation for all income levels within commuting distance of 
centres of employment not sufficiently catered for by existing share-block schemes.50 
In doing so the legislators opted not for a scheme like the Dutch 
appartementeneigendom where individual ownership of apartments is carved out of 
the co-ownership of the whole building, but created a completely new composite res 
consisting of an individual apartment together with an undivided share in the common 
property of the scheme which is registrable in a specially devised sectional title 
register kept in the existing deeds registries.51 The creation of such a new unit 
involved a breach of the maxim superficies solo cedit and the concomitant doctrine of 
components (‘Bestandteilslehre’).52 Traditionalists argued that a building is 
inseparably fused to the land and that subdivision of the building into various units is 
an attempt to divide something that is by its very nature indivisible. They warned that 
the fragmentation of the ownership of a building would ultimately lead to the 
destruction of an important economic asset. This view rests on the assumption that the 
purpose of the division of the building is to physically divide the building into 
portions that can be removed, leaving what remains of the building in an 
uninhabitable state. However, the Sectional Titles Act does not envisage a physical 
division of the building but only notional demarcation of units for exclusive 
ownership, leaving the building physically intact. Far from destroying the physical 
unity of the land and the building, the Sectional Titles Act allows exploitation of the 
land and the building to its full economic potential.53 Note that the Act acknowledges 
the destructible features of the building by placing a positive duty on sectional owners 
to maintain their sections in a proper state of repair, by creating statutory implied 
servitudes of lateral and subjacent support and by designating most structural parts of 
the building as common property.54  
 The Development and Facilitation Act of 199555 is one of the most important 
mechanisms by which the new government aims to achieve its programme of land 
reform. This Act is mainly aimed at the speedy and efficient release of land in both 
rural and urban areas for development by a fast-track process as an alternative to the 
current time-consuming procedures. Central to this process is the introduction of an 
entirely new type of ownership namely ‘initial ownership’. This concept envisages the 
introduction of security of tenure at a much earlier stage of the land development 
process by providing for the registration of a type of interim ownership called initial 
ownership as soon as a development plan and a layout plan is lodged with the 
Registrar of Deeds. The holder of a certificate of initial ownership is entitled to 
occupy and use the site, to encumber his initial ownership by means of a mortgage or 
a personal servitude, to sell and transfer the right and finally to convert it into full 
                                                 
49  Act 66 of 1971 replaced by the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
50  For the aims of sectional ownership, see C G van der Merwe Sectional Titles, Share Blocks 
and Time-sharing Vol I Sectional Titles (loose-leaf 1995-) 1-9. 
51  For innovations under the Sectional Titles Act, see C G van der Merwe op cit note 50 at 1-25 
– 1-27. 
52  C G van der Merwe op cit note 50 at 2-5. 
53  C G van der Merwe op cit note 50 at 2-5 – 2-8. 
54           Sectional Titles act 95 of 1986 s 44(1)(c), 28 and 1 s v ‘common property’ respectively. 
55  Act 67 of 1995. See in general D L Carey Miller and Anne Pope op cit note 42 at 580-582; D 




ownership when the ordinary conditions of demarcation and services are met.56  The 
Act expressly prohibits the sale or further encumbrance of the land as opposed to the 
initial ownership57 and distinct from other real rights it is open to cancellation without 
an order of court. The definition of ‘immovable property’ in section 102 of the Deeds 
Registries Act is amended to include a right of initial ownership as contemplated in 
the Development Facilitation Act. In the final analysis, a right of initial ownership is 
no more than ownership in name and anticipation without affecting the unitary 
concept of ownership as the absolute and final proprietary right. It is however real in 
the sense that it is directly enforceable against third parties and gives preference on 
insolvency or a sale in execution.58 
 
The 1973 amendment of the Deeds Registries Act  
 
 In 1973 section 6359 of the Deeds Registries Act that prohibits the registration 
of personal rights, was amended60 to facilitate the registration of rights and conditions 
contained in deeds constituting real rights. Distinct from the position in the 
Netherlands, the South African Registrars of Deeds do not register only rights but the 
entire notarial deed with contains not only conditions constituting rights. Under a 
proviso added to section 63, the Registrar of Deeds is allowed to register certain 
(personal) rights including the right to oblige a person to perform a positive duty if 
such a condition or right is in his opinion “complementary or otherwise ancillary ” to 
a registrable condition. Although this proviso has a wider application, it found its 
most dynamic application in the sphere of praedial servitudes where the imposition of 
positive duties on the owner of the servient tenement was considered to be in direct 
conflict with the overriding principle servitus in faciendo consistere nequit. 
Commentators seem to agree that this proviso does not undermine the passivity 
principle but merely provides a practical solution to the problems encountered in 
cases such as Schwedhelm vs Hauman and Van der Merwe v Wiese.61 The question for 
decision there was whether the owner of the servient land can in terms of a servitude 
of drawing water (servitus aquaehaustus) be compelled to perform a positive duty in 
the form of maintaining the network of pipes which supply the water to the dominant 
land. Although the Registrar of Deeds is now allowed to register a deed of servitude 
which, like these deeds, contain positive obligations for the owner of the servient 
tenement, the mere act of registration does not necessarily convert such conditions 
                                                 
56  S 62 and 38(1). 
57  S 62(5)(a). 
58  See also D L Carey Miller op cit note 46 at 754. 
59  S 63 of the Act reads: “No deed, or condition in a deed, purporting to create or embodying 
any personal right, and no condition which does not restrict the exercise of any right of 
ownership in respect of immovable property, shall be capable of registration” This 
legislatively confirms the so-called “subtraction of the dominium test for distinguishing 
between real and personal rights.” For a good treatment of this section, see D L Carey Miller 
and Anne Pope  op cit note 42 at 96-98.  
60      By Act 62 of 1973 s 10. 
61  1947 1 SA 127 (E) and 1948 4 SA 8 (C) respectively. In the Schwedhelm case at 37 these 
burdens were considered in conflict with the above requirement on the policy ground that ‘it 
may be contrary to public policy for the owner of land to impose at his caprice real burdens on 
his property of a character unknown to the law and to purport to bind all future owners of the 
property in perpetuity.’ 
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into real rights.62The result is apparently that only the party who initially undertakes to 
perform these positive duties will be contractually bound to do so and that the 
positive obligation will not devolve as part of the servitude on the successive owners 
of the servient land.  A subsequent purchaser of the servient land will thus only be 
bound if he expressly assumes these obligations63 or (apparently) if he buys the land 
with full knowledge of the content of the servitude.64 How far the fact that the 
undertaking by the initial owner to honour the positive obligations has been registered 
would facilitate the proof of such knowledge is still open to question. In a recent 
decision65 the court held that knowledge of the undertaking of the original owner, 
even if coupled with knowledge that the original owner intended that his successors in 
title should be bound by his undertaking, would not necessarily saddle the subsequent 
purchaser with these obligations. This view is in my submission too extreme. The fact 
that documents registered in the deeds office are supposed to be public should play a 
role in this regard.66 To summarise: the positive duties incorporated in the deed of 
servitude do not gain a real or servitutal character by being registered and the proviso 
facilitating such registration does not negate the requirement of passivity. 
 
Preregistration of contract of sale of land 
 
                                                 
62  M J de Waal  ‘Servitudes’ in Reinhard Zimmermann and Daniel Visser (eds) Southern Cross  
(1996) 803; D Kleyn and A Boraine Property Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property 3 ed (1992) 379; C G van der Merwe op cit note 8 at 477. This view was confirmed 
in Low Water Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wahloo Sand CC 1999 1 SA 655 (SE) at 662F/G-H/I: 
‘the amendment to s 63(1) retained the section as it previously read but added only the 
proviso. It is significant that the proviso does not allow the registration of personal rights per 
se. It merely authorises the registration of the deeds although it contains such conditions, 
provided the conditions are complementary or otherwise ancillary to a regisrtable condition or 
right contained or conferred in the deed. Taking into account the history of the matter it 
appears to me that the reason for adding this proviso was to accommodate situations such as 
the one with which the court was faced in Ex parte Geldenhuys and to authorise the practice, 
which the Registrar of Deeds began to follow. There is, in my view, nothing in the section as 
it presently stands which can lead one to the conclusion that it was the intention of the 
Legislature to elevate personal rights by their registration to real rights over land.’ See also the 
more detailed arguments by HR Hahlo 1948 Annual Survey of South African Law 94 - 95: 
‘[I]t would be most unfortunate if burdens which are excluded from the category of  
servitudes should be admitted into the class of real rights via the backdoor of registration. It is 
a sound common sense rule of Roman law that the circle of real rights must be narrowly 
circumscribed. Once personal rights are permitted to acquire the effect of real rights by 
registration, there is always the danger that, in the course of time, the ownership of land will 
become cluttered up with multifarious burdens of all kinds. The position thus created, while 
fertile ground for litigation, would not be in the interests of the community.’ 
63  Low Water Properties (Pty) Ltd & Another v Wahloo Sand CC 1999 1 SA 655 (SE) 664I-J. 
See the discussion of this case by Ntusi Mbodla ‘Does Registration of a Personal Right 
change its Character to that of a Real right?’ (1999) 116 SALJ 485. 
64  See M J de Waal Die Vereistes vir die Vestiging van Grondserwitutein die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Reg (doctoral thesis Stellenbosch 1989) 289 and op cit note 62 at 803 note 149 
65  Low Water Properties (Pty) Ltd & Another v Wahloo Sand CC 1999 1 SA 655 (SE) 664I-J 
66  Note that South African practitioners have not until now availed themselves of the Dutch 
practice of fortifying these positive conditions with penalty clauses in so-called 
kettingbedingen in an effort to compel sellers of land to force their successors in title to 
assume these positive duties. Note further that the South African doctrine of notice fulfils the 
purpose of the Dutch principle of good faith (goede trouw) in deciding whether successors in 
title should be saddled with duties undertaken by their predecessors.  
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 Following deeds registry practice, the Deeds Registries Act67 does not contain 
a numerus clausus of real rights but makes provision in section 102 for the 
registration of ‘any right, which becomes real on registration’. This apparently refers 
to so-called iura in personam ad rem acquirendam. Note however that it does not 
refer to personal rights in terms of an agreement to register a servitude or to transfer 
property. In such cases registration simultaneously extinguishes the personal right and 
creates a new real right.68 It rather refers to certain personal rights like rights of pre-
emption (‘voorkoopsreg’) and rights of retraction or reversionary rights 
(‘terugvallingsregte’), which are registered in spite of their personal character.69 
Despite the clear wording of the Act, the better view is that these rights remain 
personal even after registration. Registration do, however, have certain real effects in 
that the Registrar would be reluctant to register any new rights which conflict with the 
registered right and that the fact of registration would facilitate the application of the 
doctrine of notice to protect the holder of the right against successors in title with 
knowledge of the registered right.70 
 The Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 has introduced a procedure to protect 
purchasers of land on instalments who would normally only be entitled to registration 
once the full price have been paid and would thus run the risk of the seller becoming 
insolvent before such an event. The Act makes provision for the recording (not 
registration) of the contract of sale on instalments by the registrar concerned by means 
of an endorsement on the deeds registry copy of the title deed of that land. This 
procedure applies to the sale of residential land where the price is being paid in more 
than two instalments over a period exceeding one year. The seller is obliged to cause 
the contract to be recorded within three months from the date of the contract, failing 
which the purchaser may either do so himself or cancel the contact. The effect of such 
recording is that the purchaser is given the right in the event of the insolvency of the 
seller or the attachment of the property in execution to claim registration of the land in 
his name on payment of the outstanding balance (or the amount outstanding on a 
previously registered mortgage bond).71 Alternatively, if the land is sold in execution 
or on insolvency, the purchaser is given a preferential claim on the proceeds of the 
sale.72 This preferential claim ranks prior to a subsequently registered mortgage and 
defeats future sales by the seller since the registrar may not register a transfer of that 
land to any person other than the purchaser unless such recording is first cancelled. 
From the above it is clear that this statutory right of the purchaser embodies the main 
characteristics of a real right namely protection against third parties, preference on 
insolvency and the application of the prior in tempore principle. Thus another real 
right sui generis was born out of the need to improve the disadvantageous position of 




                                                 
67  Act 47 of 1937. 
68  See D  Kleyn and A Boraine  op cit note 62 at 59-60. 
69  See in general D L Carey-Miller and Anne Pope  op cit note 42 at 107-109. 
70  See D Kleyn and A Boraine  op cit note 62 at 60-62. 
71   s 22. 
72   s 20 (5) especially s 20 (5)(a) (ii). 
73  See Kenneth Reid op cit note 31 at 243-244 who states that this right approximates the 
Vormerkung and the wider Anwartschaftrecht in § 883 of the German Civil Code. 
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A final group of personal rights that are sometimes deemed to be registrable 
are the so-called onera realia, which acquires real effect on registration.74Although 
uncertainty surrounds the precise nature of onera realia, they are sometimes 
described as real burdens of Germanic origin which impose personal obligations on 
the owner of land qua landowner for example where the state grants land to a person 
subject to the condition that if the land is not developed in a certain manner the land 
will revert to the state.75 The registration of such a burden against the land 
undoubtedly restricts the owner in the unfettered exercise of his ownership and 
constitutes for that reason alone a real right. Another example of onera realia known 
to Roman-Dutch law was the obligation imposed on certain landowners to pay 
annuities or a portion of the proceeds of the land to another person.76 The courts are 
however, reluctant to register burdens, which impose positive obligations on 




 In the light of the foregoing, I would like to suggest the following tentative 
conclusions. First, although real rights in land (proprietary interests in land) have 
certain traditional characteristics, they need not necessarily have exactly the same 
content: their content may differ in view of their peculiar origin and purpose. Second, 
the notion that the content of a real right could never include a personal obligation on 
the owner of the servient erf to do something positive has developed in the sphere of 
praedial servitudes with its attachment to the notion of servitus in faciendo consistere 
nequit. Although the fact that the South African courts initially endeavoured to bring 
all new real rights within the ambit of servitudes explains the purported extension of 
this principle to other real rights, such extension is not necessarily warranted. This is 
true in the case of lease where the lessor (owner of the servient land) still retains the 
obligation to maintain the property in a good state of repair. Thirdly, it must be kept 
in mind that an exception was always allowed in the case of the servitudes of support 
where the owner of the servient tenement was under a positive obligation to provide 
the necessary support to make the servitude effective. This notion could perhaps be 
extended to cover all cases where support is needed for efficiency. Fourthly, in my 
submission the time is ripe to draw a clearer distinction between title conditions 
imposed for the sake of orderly township development and traditional real rights. This 
will probably lead to the realization that in the case of the former the imposition of 
reciprocal positive obligations on all the erven in the township is to be welcomed in 
                                                 
74  See De Villiers CJ in Registrar of Deeds (Tvl) v The Ferreira Deep Ltd1930 AD 169 at 180; 
in respect of onera realia, see also Hollins v Registrar of Deeds 1904 TS 603 607; Ex parte 
Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155; Mare v Grobler 1930 TPD 632 639; Ex parte Jerrard 1934 WLD 
87 92; Schwedhelm v Hauman 1947 1 SA 127 (EDL) 137; Nel v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue 1960 1 SA 227 (A) 232. 
75  See Benoni Town Council v Minister of Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure 1978 1 SA 978 
(T) where it was decided that the donor can reclaim land which has been exploited contrary to 
a modus which rests on the land. 
76  Cf the following passage from Voet Commentarius 8 3 12:  ‘Apart from this it can happen 
that the owner of some landed property is bound in favour of another such property to furnish 
osiers or reeds every year, and yet such a class of obligation is not on that account to be 
classed among servitudes.’ 
77  See the dicussion of the ‘subtraction of the dominium’ test in C G van der Merwe  op cit note 
8 at 70-83 and most recently in W A Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa Vol 27 Things First 
Reissue (2001) par 48. 
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the interest of orderly development and improved neighbourhood amenities. Fifthly, 
in recognizing new real rights we should not so easily accept that the recognition of a 
plethora of real rights would automatically lead to commercial sterilization78 of a 
particular piece of landed property. This is illustrated by the notion of sectional titles 
where the recognition of a multitude of ownership rights led to the best possible 
exploitation of a property asset situated in a central location in the provision of much 
needed residential accommodation. Having said this, it should be realised that the 
South African land reform programme can only be accommodated if the recognition 
of new real rights is based on social policies rather than a market driven economy.79 
Finally, an encouraging feature of the South African involvement in the creation and 
extinction of categories of real rights is that South Africa has in spite of justifiable 
emotional and political undertones always regarded a unitary system of ownership as 
the pinnacle of genuine security of title.80 This is illustrated by the way in which 
several ownership-like rights such as hereditary lease (erfpag) and its English-based 
counterpart perpetual quitrent and building rights (opstalreg) and its English-based 
counterpart 99-years leasehold have steadily been upgraded to ownership. The same 
is fortunately also true for the most important constitutional land reform measures as 
illustrated by the possibility created for certain labour tenants to acquire title to 
portions of land as restitution for title lost by discriminatory measures as well as by 
the fact that initial ownership is purely preliminary in nature with the holder waiting 
in the wings for his inchoate ownership to be upgraded to full ownership as soon as 
the prerequisites for security of title namely demarcation and services have been 
complied with. Could this all be the manifestations of an inherent dynamism to keep 
the magic circle of categories of real rights as small and as intact as possible?  
 
                                                 
78  This phrase was borrowed from a lecture delivered by Professor Kenneth Reid at the 
Conference on Real rights in Utrecht on 15 June 2001. 
79  See already Carole Lewis op cit note 30 at 614-615 especially at 614: ‘Perhaps the criteria for 
determining whether a right should be registrable against title should, then, be whether it 
constitutes a right in or to the land, which is socially and economically desirable in the 
interests of the landowner and the community in which the land is situate, and, most 
importantly, which will enhance the proper exploitation of the land.’ 
80  See the White Paper on South African Land Policy, April 1997, 4.19 and 6.15.3; D L Carey 
Miller and Anne Pope op cit note 42 at 566-567 and 588-589. 
